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Abstract

Workers in Ontario, Canada are on the edge of a crisis in the enforcement of their minimum employment
standards (ES). This crisis is shaped not only by well-documented deficiencies in the scope of labour
protection but by the fact that the administration of the ES system has not kept pace with the increasing
number of workers and workplaces requiring protection under the province’s employment standards act.
Coupled with an outmoded complaint-based system, the dearth of support for ES enforcement is cultivating a
situation in which an unprecedented number of workers are bearers of rights without genuine opportunities
for redress. Responding to this situation, this article explores how measures augmenting the voices of workers
and their advocates could contribute to improving ES enforcement in Ontario. It does so through a review of
innovative practices in other common law contexts characterized by similar enforcement regimes where
labour market conditions have likewise deteriorated.
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“Rights without Remedies”: Enforcing
Employment Standards in Ontario by
Maximizing Voice among Workers in
Precarious Jobs
Leah f. vosko *
Workers in Ontario, Canada are on the edge of a crisis in the enforcement of their minimum
employment standards (ES). This crisis is shaped not only by well-documented deficiencies
in the scope of labour protection but by the fact that the administration of the ES system has
not kept pace with the increasing number of workers and workplaces requiring protection
under the province’s Employment Standards Act. Coupled with an outmoded complaintbased system, the dearth of support for ES enforcement is cultivating a situation in which
an unprecedented number of workers are bearers of rights without genuine opportunities
for redress. Responding to this situation, this article explores how measures augmenting the
voices of workers and their advocates could contribute to improving ES enforcement in Ontario.
It does so through a review of innovative practices in other common law contexts characterized
by similar enforcement regimes where labour market conditions have likewise deteriorated.
Les travailleurs de l’Ontario, au Canada, sont au bord de la crise en ce qui a trait au respect de
leurs normes minimales d’emploi. Cette crise se dessine non seulement en raison de lacunes
bien documentées dans le cadre de la protection des travailleurs, mais encore parce que
l’administration du système des normes d’emploi n’a pas suivi le rythme de l’augmentation
du nombre des travailleurs et des lieux de travail nécessitant une protection en vertu de la
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Loi sur les normes d’emploi de la province. Associé à un système désuet axé sur les plaintes,
le peu de soutien au respect des normes d’emploi fait perdurer une situation où, même si un
nombre sans précédent de travailleurs bénéficient de ces droits, ils n’ont pas véritablement
l’occasion de les faire valoir. Réagissant à cette situation, le présent article passe en revue les
pratiques novatrices mises de l’avant dans d’autres secteurs de la common law caractérisés
par un régime semblable de contrôle d’application et où les conditions du marché du travail
s’étaient également détériorées afin de déterminer si des mesures faisant mieux entendre
la voix des travailleurs et de leurs défenseurs peuvent contribuer à améliorer le respect des
normes d’emploi en Ontario.
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Workers in Ontario are on the edge of a crisis in the enforcement of

their minimum employment standards (ES). This crisis is shaped not only by
well-documented deficiencies in the scope of labour protection but by the fact
that the administration of the ES system has not kept pace with the increasing
number of workers and workplaces requiring protection under the Employment
Standards Act (ESA).1 The dearth of support for ES enforcement, coupled
with an outmoded complaint-based system, is cultivating a situation in which
an unprecedented number of workers are bearers of rights without genuine
opportunities for redress.2 Indicative of the principally reactive approach to

1.
2.

Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41 [ESA].
Hence the allusion in the title of this article to “rights without remedies,” which refers to
a comment made by former Ontario Minister of Labour, Chris Bentley. In 2004, shortly
before departing from his post, Bentley noted that “[r]ights without remedies will not be
rights for long … a new, more effective approach to enforcement of employment standards is
long overdue.” See Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Hansard 38th Parl, 1st Sess (26 April 2004)
at 1400 (Chris Bentley), online: <http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/38-1/l037.
htm>.
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enforcement, Ontario’s ES system is characterized by a backlog of unresolved
claims, a complaint process resting on individual workers coming forward in an
increasingly hostile environment, and an inspectorate unable to keep pace with
regulatory provisions for proactive inspection. Giving workers and their advocates
a stronger voice in ES enforcement is critical to ameliorating this mounting crisis.
In response to this challenge, this article explores how measures that augment the voices of workers and their advocates could contribute to improving
ES enforcement in Ontario. It does so through a review of innovative practices
in other common law contexts characterized by similar enforcement regimes
where labour market conditions have likewise deteriorated. Proceeding in four
parts, the analysis begins in Part I with a description of how the concept of voice
is employed herein, and its importance for workers in precarious jobs characterized by a lack of union representation. In studies of labour market regulation,
voice is identified typically with union representation. An increasing number of
workers for whom ES are the principal source of labour protection, however, do
not have redress through unions and face other labour market insecurities. Many
of these workers are also members of social groups confronting other challenges
to realizing labour rights and protections (e.g., women, recent immigrants,
temporary migrant workers, young people, et cetera). For such workers, a lack
of union representation, together with other structural disadvantages, creates a
climate in which violations, as well as practices evading and eroding workplace
laws, are commonplace.
Part II describes the crisis in ES enforcement in Ontario, focussing on the
enforcement system’s primarily reactive or complaint-based orientation, and
how this approach, which places the onus of enforcement in individual workers’
hands, mutes the voices of workers in precarious jobs. Part III canvasses practices
in other jurisdictions that offer potential models for countering the degree of
individualization faced by workers in Ontario in seeking to realize their ES
rights and entitlements. In identifying innovations that give workers and their
advocates a greater voice in enforcement, Part III provides examples of how
state agencies, workers’ advocates (unions and community organizations), and
partnerships between state agencies and workers’ advocates can support both
individual workers and workers’ collective voice. Finally, bridging the critique
of Ontario’s ES enforcement regime and the review of practices adopted elsewhere, Part IV identifies voice mechanisms that offer promise in remedying the
enforcement crisis in Ontario.
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I. VOICE IN THE REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT
STANDARDS
As it is used here, in relation to the topic of workplace regulation, voice entails
the ability to pre-empt grievances in the workplace or to make such grievances
effective (i.e., realize their effective remedy or resolution).3 In a broad sense, voice
amounts to the capacity to speak and be heard as a member of the community of
workers served by formal legal protections and the associated enforcement policies.
Although there is a range of approaches to the study of voice, scholars in the
traditions of political science and law typically see voice in the light of rights,
linking it to humanism and industrial citizenship.4 As Adrian Wilkinson and
Charles Fay note, “the concept of industrial democracy (which draws from notions of
industrial citizenship) sees participation as a fundamental democratic right for workers to extend a degree of control over managerial decision making.”5 Others add
that free speech and human dignity have a place in the voice/participation matrix.6
Complementing this approach, scholars in industrial relations conceive of
voice in terms of representation. Here, analysts focus typically on power relations
and control over the labour process in central institutions of labour market regulation (especially collective bargaining structures) and view representation as key to
countervailing power. They identify voice with democratic trade unions, which
are seen as the primary agents for supporting workers in exercising their rights
since they are independent and membership-based. Although there is growing
acknowledgment of the need for representation among non-unionized workers
3.

4.
5.
6.

Richard B Freeman & James L Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (New York: Basic Books, 1984)
at 7-11; John W Budd, Paul J Gollan & Adrian Wilkinson, “New approaches to employee
voice and participation in organizations” (2010) 63:3 Hum Rel 303; Tony Dundon et al,
“The meanings and purpose of employee voice” (2004) 15:6 Int’l J Hum Res Mgmt 1149;
Cynthia Estlund, “Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation” (2005)
105:2 Colum L Rev 319.
HW Arthurs, “Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada’s Second
Century” (1967) 45:4 Can Bar Rev 786.
“New Times for Employee Voice?” (2011) 50:1 Hum Res Mgmt 65 at 67.
See e.g. International Labour Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work, 86th session, Geneva (18 June 1998), online: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/decl/declaration/index.htm>; John W Budd, Rafael Gomez & Noah M Meltz,
“Why a Balance is Best: The Pluralist Industrial Relations Paradigm of Balancing Competing
Interests” in Bruce E Kaufman, ed, Theoretical Perspectives on Work and the Employment
Relationship (Champaign, Ill: Industrial Relations Research Association, 2004) 195 at 19798; Janice R Foley and Michael Polanyi, “Workplace Democracy: Why Bother?” (2006) 27:1
Econ & Indus Democ 173.
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in the face of declining rates of unionization, most scholarship in this tradition
centres on those best able to express their workplace concerns.7 To this end, it
also largely takes a particular employment model as given: the standard employment
relationship,8 in which the worker works full-time and continuously for one employer
on his or her premises under direct supervision, normally in a unionized situation,
and has access to a social wage.9 Concomitantly, it assumes the native-born male
industrial worker as its central subject.
The focus of my inquiry, by contrast, is workers beyond those who are in a
position to complain or to play the role of the protagonist10 in ES enforcement. It
includes both workers who lack formal representation altogether and those who
face other structural disadvantages inhibiting their access to representation.11 Its
presumed subjects normally do not have access to union representation, which makes
them dependent principally on ES rather than the often more favourable terms of
collective agreements. They may also be disadvantaged with respect to the scope of
labour protections provided via ES because of, in the case of gender relations, divisions of paid and unpaid labour shaping men’s and women’s labour force status as
well scheduling and work arrangements; in the case of immigration status, differential
7.

But see Vanessa Tait, Poor Workers’ Unions: rebuilding labor from below (Cambridge, Mass:
South End Press, 2005); Jennifer Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant
Rights (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2005); Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing
Communities at the Edge of the Dream (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
8. Ulrich Mückenberger, “Non-standard forms of employment in the Federal Republic of
Germany: The role and effectiveness of the State” in Gerry Rodgers & Janine Rodgers, eds,
Precarious Jobs in Labour Market Regulation: The Growth of Atypical Employment in Western
Europe (Geneva: International Labour Organization, International Institute for Labour
Studies, 1989) 267 at 267-68.
9. Freeman and Medoff cast unions alternatively as conduits, particularly for the expression
of voice amongst “inframarginal” employees, since their compensation packages and job
security are tied to length of service and, hence, the countervailing exit option is not
desirable. See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 3. See also Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1970).
10. Eric Tucker, “Old Lessons for New Governance: Safety or Profit and the New Conventional
Wisdom” in Theo Nichols & David Walters, eds, Governance, Change, and the Work
Environment: Safety, Profit and the Conventional Wisdom (Amityville, NY: Baywood) at 27
[forthcoming in 2013] [Tucker, “Old Lessons for New Governance”].
11. Although it is beyond the scope of this investigation to engage extensively with scholarly
literature on the impacts of neo-liberalism, it is worth emphasizing that the ranks of these
two groups have swelled in recent decades with the transition from Keynesianism to neoliberalism. See e.g. Jamie Peck, Workfare States (New York: Guilford Press, 2001); Mark P
Thomas, Regulating Flexibility: The Political Economy of Employment Standards (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009).
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provision of rights and access to supports for citizens and permanent residents,
temporary work permit holders, and non-status workers based on form of immigration and duration of stay in the country; and, in the case of age, graduated
social minima. Structural disadvantage may also relate to the overlapping issue
of workers’ employment status and form of employment, since ES coverage
pivots on the standard employment relationship. Distinctions between different
employment statuses (self-employment or paid employment) and among forms
of paid employment (part-time or full-time, temporary or permanent) operate to
exclude certain categories of workers fully or partially from access to ES entitlements.
Such exclusion can be by design, as is the case for the self-employed, or by implementation, as is the case with part-time and temporary employees unable to qualify for
ES protections due to their hours of work or tenure in a single job.12
In defining ES-dependent workers, I therefore aim to encompass workers
whose employment situations do not match the standard employment relationship, a group that includes many women, immigrants, and young people. I also
seek to include those whose connections to paid employment are, at times, tenuous
due to circumstances linked to structural disadvantage as well as those who do not
currently have a job since, in a complaint-based enforcement system of the sort
operating in Ontario, workers are often in a position to complain only after they
have left their jobs. In identifying actors and institutions with potential roles to
play in representing ES-dependent workers, I correspondingly include workers’
advocates (e.g., legal case workers) and workers’ centres, which often identify
more with community than with workplace concerns and typically take a holistic
12. See generally Leah F Vosko, Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment
Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah
Vosko, “The Legal Concept of Employment: Marginalizing Workers” (Originally prepared
for the Law Commission of Canada, 25 October 2002), online: Government of Canada
Publications <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2007/lcc-cdc/JL2-35-2002E.
pdf> [Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, “The Legal Concept of Employment”]; Stephanie Bernstein,
“Mitigating Precarious Employment in Quebec: The Role of Minimum Employment
Standards Legislation” in Leah F Vosko, ed, Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour
Market Insecurity in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006) 221 [Vosko,
Precarious Employment]; Katherine Lippel, “Precarious Employment and Occupational
Health and Safety Regulation in Quebec” in Vosko, Precarious Employment (ibid) 241; Eric
Tucker, “Will the Vicious Circle of Precariousness be Unbroken? The Exclusion of Ontario
Farm Workers from the Occupational Health and Safety Act” [Tucker, “Vicious Circle of
Precariousness”] in Vosko, Precarious Employment (ibid) 256; Leah F Vosko, “Precarious
Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of Labour Market Insecurity” [Vosko,
“Labour Market Insecurity”] in Vosko, Precarious Employment (ibid) 3; Leah F Vosko,
Managing the Margins: Gender, Citizenship, and the International Regulation of Precarious
Employment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) [Vosko, Managing the Margins].
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approach to the experiences of working people due to the constituencies they
support.13 Workers’ centres and workers’ advocates may be focused not only on narrow
workplace issues but on broader social and economic concerns linked to processes of
social reproduction. For this reason, they may be uniquely positioned to observe
systematic tendencies, including the fact that “the current [individualized
rights-based model for enforcing ES in Ontario] … sets different de facto
standards of legal compliance for employers of low-wage earners versus highwage earners”14 because the low waged do not earn enough to receive adequate
legal support. Workers’ centres and workers’ advocates may also be well-situated
to assist ES-dependent workers in actualizing their rights through broad-based
strategies that extend beyond particular workplaces.
Enabling more workers to exercise voice in ES enforcement requires a greater
plurality of mechanisms for redress for those facing violations and other forms of
evasive behaviour, as well as an expanded group of actors and institutions upon
whom they can rely for support.

II. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT IN ONTARIO
ES are legislated standards setting minimum terms and conditions of employment
in areas such as wages, working time, vacations, public holidays, equal pay for
equal work, leaves of absence, and termination and severance of employment.
They are meant to serve as the floor of workplace protection for most workers in
a labour market, but they are the main source of protection for workers in nonunionized jobs. Despite their significance for the over six million workers in the
over 370,000 workplaces in Ontario, a large body of literature reveals gaps in
the scope of coverage under the ESA. These shortcomings are acute for workers
in precarious jobs, which typically involve forms of employment differing from
the standard employment relationship. Existing studies reveal a misfit between
coverage under the ESA and solo self-employment, part-time employment, and
temporary paid employment—forms of employment in which workers often
experience high levels of uncertainty, low income, a lack of access to regulatory
13. See Cynthia J Cranford et al, “Thinking through Community Unionism” in Vosko,
Precarious Employment (supra note 12) 353; Janice Fine, “A Marriage Made in Heaven?:
Mismatches and Misunderstandings between Worker Centres and Unions” (2007) 45:2 Brit
J Indus Rel 335. See also Simon J Black, “Community Unionism: A Strategy for Organizing
in the New Economy” (2005) 14: 3 New Lab Forum 24.
14. Samuel Estreicher & Zev J Eigen, “The forum for adjudication of employment disputes” in
Cynthia L Estlund & Michael L Wachter, eds, Research Handbook on the Economics of Labor
and Employment Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010) 409 at 414.
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protection, and limited control over the labour process.15 Another significant area
of weakness under the ESA relates to enforcement. Although the limited resources
devoted to enforcement affect all workers covered by the ESA,16 the enforcement
gap is particularly significant for workers in precarious jobs, including those who
may technically be covered by its provisions but are not in a position to access
their rights. This less well-studied contemporary gap is the focus of this Part.17
A. The Existing Machinery18

In Ontario, workers’ access to ES depends on the Ministry of Labour’s (MOL)
ability to oversee their implementation, since this branch of government is
mandated to administer, enforce, and promote compliance with the ESA and
15. See Vosko, “Labour Market Insecurity,” supra note 12; Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, “The
Legal Concept of Employment,” supra note 12; Judy Fudge & Leah F Vosko, “Gender,
Segmentation, and the Standard Employment Relationship in Canadian Labour Law,
Legislation and Policy” (2001) 22:2 Econ & Indus Democ 271; Bernstein, supra note 12;
Tucker, “Vicious Circle of Precariousness,” supra note 12; Andrea M Noack & Leah F
Vosko, “Precarious Jobs in Ontario: Mapping Dimensions of Labour Market Insecurity by
Workers’ Social Location and Context” Law Commission of Ontario, Vulnerable Workers
and Precarious Work Project (2011), online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/vulnerable-workerscommissioned-papers-vosko-noack.pdf>.
16. Attesting to the magnitude of this gap, the number of workers covered by the ESA increased
between 1997 and 2007 by 24 per cent. Over the same period, funding for the ES Program
decreased by 33 per cent. Indeed, even significant increases in 2009–2010, flowing from the
provincial government’s recognition of the problem, leave funding levels over ten per cent
below 1997 levels without adjusting for inflation. See Leah F Vosko et al, “New Approaches
to Enforcement and Compliance with Labour Regulatory Standards: The Case of Ontario,
Canada” Law Commission of Ontario, Vulnerable Workers and Precarious Work Project
(2011) at 30, online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/vulnerable-workers-commissioned-papersvosko-tucker-thomas-gellatly.pdf> [Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement”].
17. For a detailed history of Ontario’s ES regime, documenting the contemporary shift from
a Keynesian emphasis on welfarism, under which ES were understood as minimum floor
and enforced largely through proactive measures, to a neoliberal emphasis on “regulated
flexibility” characterized by a move to a reactive model, see Thomas, supra note 11. On the
administration of the ESA at its inception, see Marion E Lane, Administration in Action: An
Institutional Analysis of the Ontario Employment Standards Branch (LLM Thesis, University of
California at Berkeley, 1977) [unpublished].
18. The following discussion of the enforcement machinery in Ontario draws partly on data
collected for a report prepared for the Law Commission of Ontario of which I am a coauthor. See Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement,” supra note 16. I thank Mary
Gellatly, Mark Thomas, and Eric Tucker for permitting me to use this material in preparing
this section of this article as well as for encouraging me to prepare this stand-alone piece,
expanding one of my own contributions to that Report—namely, its survey of enforcement
practices in other jurisdictions.
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its regulations. Under the ESA, Employment Standards Officers (ESOs) and the
Director of Employment Standards have considerable powers of investigation
(e.g., to enter business premises and requisition records for inspection). ESOs also
have a great deal of leeway in resolving complaints of violations. Enforcement tools
include the precipitation of settlements, orders to pay, fines, compliance orders, and
prosecutions. The level of discretion accorded to ESOs and other officials responsible
for enforcement makes this arena of workplace regulation fertile ground for the
investigation of mechanisms for augmenting workers’ voice.
In the face of limited legislative direction, Ontario’s ES enforcement regime
amounts to a reactive system supplemented by voluntary compliance and proactive measures.19 The bulk of the MOL’s enforcement efforts depend on worker
complaints to trigger regulatory intervention, and they emphasize negotiated
settlements, principally using coercive measures such as orders to pay and, in
egregious cases, prosecution.20 When measures promoting voluntary compliance
19. Although reactive approaches are most prevalent in ES enforcement, and hence the focus
of this section, the MOL uses voluntary and proactive approaches selectively. Among its
strategies of voluntary compliance, it operates a call centre, the Employment Standards
Information Centre, assisting callers with questions about the ESA, and it provides multilingual interpreters. The call centre does not provide legal advice. It received almost 350,000
calls in 2009–2010. Staff members also answer emails from workers and employers; indeed,
they prepared nine thousand responses in 2009–2010. See Vosko et al, “New Approaches
to Enforcement,” supra note 16 at 15. Additionally, the MOL website includes tutorials
explaining provisions of the ESA, how they apply to workers and employers, how to file a
claim, and videos demonstrating to employers what they are to expect in cases of inspection
and describing to workers what they are to expect upon filing a claim. Among its proactive
strategies, the MOL uses targeted inspections and enlarged investigations in select instances
of when violations are detected. See Ontario Ministry of Labour, Administration Manual
for Employment Standards (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 2010) at ch 4 [copy
on file with the author] [MOL, Administration Manual]. Expanded investigations are
most common; in such instances a workplace is identified for investigation based on the
results found during an individual claim investigation. Notably, resources devoted to such
inspections pale in comparison to those devoted to the reactive system. In 2009–2010, for
example, the MOL conducted ninety-nine expanded investigations in contrast to 20,762
individual claims investigations. See Ontario Ministry of Labour, Employment Standards
Program Annual Report, 2009-2010 (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 2010) [copy on
file with the author].
20. On the notion of reactive enforcement, as well as how it operates in other jurisdictions,
see Glenda Maconachie & Miles Goodwin, “Recouping wage underpayment: increasingly
less likely?” (2006) 41:3 Aust J Soc Issues 327; Federal Labour Standards Review, “New
compliance strategies: ‘Hard law’ approach” by Paul Leonard Gallina (Human Resources
Development Canada, 2005), online: <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/employment_
standards/fls/pdf/research20.pdf>; National Employment Law Project, Winning Wage Justice:
An Advocate’s Guide to State and City Policies to Fight Wage Theft (January 2011) at 57-58,
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are unsuccessful, individual workers must first seek a remedy from their employer
and, when such efforts fail to produce results, they may file a claim with the
MOL for unpaid wages and other ES entitlements. Typically, complaints initiate
an investigation, which may lead to prosecution and penalties for employers and
settlements for workers. Upon the introduction of an online claims process in 2006–
2007, the MOL posted a self-help kit designed to assist workers in learning about
their ESA entitlements, determining which ES had been violated, and calculating the
amount of unpaid wages owed to them in cases of violations. This kit then instructed
workers first to contact their employer to obtain wages and entitlements owing.
Through such investigative processes, typically 80 per cent of claims are ‘resolved,’
a percentage encompassing claims withdrawn by the claimant, settled by workers and
their employers directly, complied with by employers (i.e., where an ESO determination finds the employer in violation), or denied.21 In fewer than 20 per cent of cases,
the ESO issues an order to pay, which claimants and employers have a right to
appeal to the Ontario Labour Relations Board (although few take this route). In the
majority of cases that are settled, any orders respecting employers’ contraventions are
void22; many employer contraventions of the ESA are thereby erased from public view
through processes of negotiating, promoting, or brokering of settlement agreements
formerly prohibited.23 Furthermore, in cases where settlements are not reached and
the ESO resumes the investigation and decision-making, if an employer voluntarily
complies with the ESO’s decision that an ES entitlement must be provided to a
claimant, the employer is required to pay either what he or she technically owes the
worker or less24 when a lower settlement is accepted.25
online: <http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/WinningWageJustice2011.pdf?nocdn=1>.
21. Workers Action Centre & Employment Standards Work Group, Modernizing Part III of
the Canada Labour Code, (submitted to the Federal Labour Standards Review Commission,
October 2005), online: <http://www.workersactioncentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/
pb_Modernizing_eng.pdf>.
22. Mary Gellatly et al, “‘Modernizing’ Employment Standards?: Administrative Efficiency and
the Production of the Illegitimate Claimant in Ontario, Canada” (2011) 22:2 Econ & Lab
Rel Rev 81.
23. MOL, Administration Manual, supra note 19, s 5.6.14.
24. A pilot project of facilitated settlements conducted after the introduction of the Open for
Business Act, 2010 found that 21 per cent of cases that went to a decision-making meeting
were resolved through settlements and that these cases resulted in settlements of, on average,
17 per cent lower than what was assessed to be owed by the ESO. See Ontario Ministry
of Labour, Meeting with Workers’ Action Centre & Parkdale Community Legal Services,
Employment Practices Branch “ES Modernization Progress Update” [copy on file with the
author], cited in Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement,” supra note 16 at 18, n 50.
25. Furthermore, when an ES complaint is settled without the issuance of an order to pay, there
can be no fines levied through contravention notices.
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When sanctions are deemed appropriate, the ESA sets out a variety of options,
including orders to pay wages and to reinstate workers as well as prosecution, but
there are no criteria for the use of such sanctions and penalties. A key component
of ES enforcement is the recovery of wages and other monies owed to workers. Collections, however, represent a challenging facet of enforcement since
a substantial amount of the monies owed to workers are from employers who
are insolvent or bankrupt, a category that grew dramatically in the 2008–2009
recession,26 and since the MOL has privatized some of its collection activities.27
B. WORKER VOICE IN A NARROWLY REACTIVE REGIME: THE PERILS OF
INDIVIDUALIZATION

Despite the focus on worker claims of ES violations, the reactive system impedes
worker voice in many ways. The majority of resources for enforcing ES in Ontario are devoted to investigating individual complaints of employer violations
even though, as Ron Saunders and Patrice Dutil note, “dealing with compliance
one case at a time is expensive and risks overloading the available capacity.”28
Indicative of the problem of overloaded capacity, there was a backlog of fourteen
thousand complaints as of 2010. In response, the MOL pledged to eliminate
this backlog by March 2012. However, due to the extra resources required to
fulfill this objective, following its elimination, the MOL promised to pre-empt
future backlogs through an “enhanced compliance strategy … reaching out to
employers through a mix of education, outreach and enforcement to … stem any
problems before they arise.”29
26. Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement,” supra note 16 at 22. In such instances,
recovery of, for example, unpaid wages is difficult because workers are typically one of several
creditors’ owed money and are paid subject to priority ranking as determined by federal
bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. Here, the MOL assists employees by filing Proofs of
Claim with the Trustee in Bankruptcy or the Monitor.
27. This situation has led the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario to characterize weaknesses
in the collections of amounts in default owed to workers by employers as a major problem
with the ES regime. Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2004 Annual Report (30
November 2004) at 240, online: <http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_en/en04/309en04.
pdf http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_2004_en.htm> [Auditor General of Ontario, 2004
Annual Report]; Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2006 Annual Report (5 December
2006), at 311, online: <http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_en/en06/409en06.pdf>.
28. “New Approaches in Achieving Compliance with Statutory Employment Standards”
Canadian Policy Research Network & The Institute of Public Administration of Canada
(July 2005) at 2, online: <http://www.cprn.org/documents/37835_en.pdf>.
29. Ontario Ministry of Labour, Employment Standards: Ministry Successes (29 July 2011), online:
<http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/news/nr_esenforcement110729.php>.
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As for the process of complaints resolution, enforcement also falls largely in
the hands of individual workers who face numerous barriers in pursuing claims.
The individual claims-making process inhibits workers who remain on the job
(and aim to maintain their present job) from making claims because there is
no provision for anonymous or confidential complaints, or for complaints filed
by third parties. Nor is interim reinstatement pending investigation available to
fired workers, even though it is available to unionized workers under the Ontario
Labour Relations Act30 in certain circumstances. For workers who opt to complain
while they are still on the job, anti-reprisal provisions apply. Yet even though such
provisions place the burden of proof on the employer, this burden only applies
to a finite set of circumstances despite the wide-ranging forms retaliation may
take.31 Given such barriers, nine out of ten workers file ES claims after they have
left the job.32
In addition to obstacles acute among workers in precarious jobs, such as the
inability to survive on unemployment insurance benefits of 55 per cent (the current replacement rate) of already meagre earnings if they lose their jobs due to
retaliation (and if they qualify), workers reliant on ES protections also face barriers
related to their social location. Workers’ immigration status is a case in point. Under
federal immigration policy, many workers migrating under Canada’s temporary and
temporary-to-permanent immigration programs33 are required to hold employment
30. Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, ch 1, Schedule A.
31. According to the Employment Standards Act, the burden of proof applies if the employee:
(i) asks the employer to comply with this Act and the regulations,
(ii) makes inquiries about his or her rights under this Act,
(iii) files a complaint with the Ministry under this Act,
(iv) exercises or attempts to exercise a right under this Act,
(v) gives information to an employment standards officer,
(vi) testifies or is required to testify or otherwise participates or is going to participate in a
proceeding under this Act,
(vii) participates in proceedings respecting a by-law or proposed by-law under section 4 of
the Retail Business Holidays Act,
(viii) is or will become eligible to take a leave, intends to take a leave or takes a leave under
Part XIV.
See ESA, supra note 1, s 74(1)(a).
32. Auditor General of Ontario, 2004 Annual Report, supra note 27 at 242.
33. Attesting to the growing significance of temporary and temporary-to-permanent immigration
programs in Canada, between 1987 and 2011, the number of temporary migrant workers
grew from 131,752 to 446,847, over 67,000 of which resided in Ontario. See Citizenship
and Immigration Canada, Research and Evaluation Branch, “Facts and Figures 2011—
Immigration Overview: Permanent and Temporary Residents,” online: <http://www.cic.
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for a specified period, often with a specific employer. For example, temporary
migrant workers who work, often year after year, under the Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Program and the Low-Skill Temporary Foreign Worker Program are tied
normally to one employer for a specific term. These workers have the same rights
to ES as other workers. However, workers with insecure immigration status who
face substandard conditions of employment are rarely in a position to complain
due to implicit or explicit threats that they will be penalized by the immigration
system (e.g., with deportation).
For those workers willing to take the risk to raise their voice, the complaint
process is riddled with obstacles, especially for those in precarious jobs who confront
other structural disadvantages. In practice, both the step initially recommended
in the self-help kit, and made mandatory for most workers under the Open for
Business Act, 2010,34 that workers first seek compliance from employers before
being permitted to file an ES claim, and the requirement, also introduced by this
legislation, that workers provide information in writing sufficient for the case to
proceed, make many uninformed assumptions about the situation of workers
reliant on ES. They presume that ES-dependent workers have access to the internet (given that the MOL’s website is the primary source of knowledge about ESA
rights),35 strong English language skills,36 high levels of literacy (at a minimum,
a level sufficient to submit a lengthy claim form, requiring extensive narrative

gc.ca/english/pdf/research-stats/facts2011.pdf>.
34. Open for Business Act, 2010, SO 2010, c 16, amending Employment Standards Act, 2000,
SO 2000, c 41 [Open for Business Act]. The exceptions are young workers, live-in caregivers,
people with language barriers or a disability, workers who are afraid to contact the employer,
workers with non-monetary complaints, workers approaching the six month time limit, or
workers whose employer has closed or gone bankrupt.
35. Reliance on internet access creates significant barriers for many people that are structurally
disadvantaged. Statistics Canada reports that if someone is poor, older, lives in a rural
community, was born outside of Canada, and/or has relatively low levels of education, he or
she is less likely to use or have use of the internet. See Statistics Canada, Canadian Internet
Use Survey (12 June 2008), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/080612/
dq080612b-eng.htmhttp://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/080612/dq080612b-eng.
htm>.
36. According to one study, as many as half a million people in Ontario may need an interpreter
in pursuing legal matters. Yet no language interpretation services are provided to workers who
require them in the ES claims process. See Karen Cohl & George Thomson, “Connecting
Across Language and Distance: Linguistic and Rural Access to Legal Information and
Services” The Law Foundation of Ontario, Linguistic and Rural Access to Justice Project
(December 2008) at 13, online: <http://www.lawfoundation.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/TheConnecting-Report.pdf>.
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accounts in writing, to initiate investigation),37 and knowledge of how highly
complex legal rights apply to their own conditions of work.38 The newly introduced information requirement also stands in stark contrast to the previous process
of claims investigation. Prior to the introduction of the Open for Business Act, when
a worker filed a claim, an ESO investigated whether or not, and if so, which, ES
violations had taken place by seeking information from both the claimant and
the employer through telephone calls, letters, and fact-finding meetings in which
both parties were given the opportunity to present their cases. The ESO then
evaluated evidence provided by the employer and the employee and made a
determination. ESOs could thus gather evidence in ways attentive to barriers
faced by workers in precarious jobs. Furthermore, the introduction of an
information requirement is paradoxical as it was accompanied by a legislative
change granting ESOs greater leeway in dealing with undue delays by allowing
them to make determinations based upon the best information available.39
Heightening these voice problems, ES are alone among workplace regulations
conferring employment rights in that they provide for no government or quasigovernment funded assistance for workers who perceive their rights to have been
violated. The MOL and other government agencies provide funding for information, education, and legal support in areas of health and safety, workplace safety
and insurance, and human rights (e.g., Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario
Workers, Office of the Worker Advisor, Human Rights Legal Support Centre).
Yet few legal supports exist for workers pursuing claims under the ESA, who
also have limited representational routes for voicing their experiences. Ontario’s
Community Legal Clinic system provided ESA representation in eighty-six cases,
ninety brief services, and advice for just over 850 workers in 2008.40 There are
37. To access the ES claim form online, see Ontario Ministry of Labour, Form: Employment
Standards Claim (January 2011), online: <http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/forms/
claim.php>. There is a link between literacy and social location. For example, “individuals
with low literacy skills” tend to be “older, less educated, immigrants or ha[ve] a mother
tongue other than English or French.” See Statistics Canada, International Adult Literacy
Survey: Learning Literacy in Canada: Evidence from the International Survey of Reading Skills
by S Grenier et al, Catalogue no 89-552-MIE—No 19 (January 2008) at 37, online: <http://
www.nald.ca/library/research/stats/llc/llc.pdf>.
38. Gellatly et al, supra note 22 at 93.
39. See ESA, supra note 1, ss 102.1(1)-(3).
40. See Soyini Barrington, Policy and Research, Legal Aid Ontario (9 July 2009) [copy on file
with the author], cited in Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement,” supra note 16 at
35, n 82. For an informative parallel study addressing the issue of wage recovery in Australia
and demonstrating the importance of legal support services in fostering access to justice
among workers, see Chris Arup & Carolyn Sutherland, “The Recovery of Wages: Legal
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no legal aid certificates for ESA matters. The $10,000 cap on ESA claims also
means that few lawyers in the private bar can afford to represent workers. And
the time limit of six months to file a claim makes the meagre compensation available
to aggrieved workers highly time sensitive. In each of these ways, the ES enforcement
system thwarts worker voice in the claims-making process, a profound limitation for
those who rely on the ESA as their principal source of labour protection.

III. AMPLIFYING WORKERS’ VOICE: SURVEYING INNOVATIVE
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
The growing crisis of ES enforcement in Ontario stems from its narrow reactive
regime, which places the onus of enforcement principally on individual workers
without giving them meaningful voice by making available appropriate supports
in the complaints process and making possible greater involvement of key actors
across the enforcement regime (e.g., in pursuing investigations and inspections
and in determining penalties and settlements). Although there are promises and
pitfalls in transplanting approaches from one jurisdiction to another,41 as an
extensive body of literature in comparative law and comparative labour law
illustrates, innovative initiatives operating in other common law contexts characterized by broadly similar political cultures and legal traditions offer insight into
countering the deficiencies that characterize Ontario’s ES enforcement regime.42
Services and Access to Justice” (2009) 35 Monash UL Rev 96.
41. A range of commentators have contributed to the transplantability debate in comparative
law and comparative labour law, including Bob Hepple, Otto Kahn-Freund, Pierre Legrand,
and Alan Watson. Some such authors suggest, quite contentiously, that legal transplants
are common and easy to implement socially (Watson), whereas others contend, more
moderately, that transferability is best approached as a continuum (Kahn-Freund). Still
others argue that genuine transplantation is difficult to achieve due to cultural and historical
factors (Legrand). In an extensive review of the central debates on legal transplantability in
comparative law and comparative labour law outlining these distinct positions, Anthony
Forsyth demonstrates, building on Gunther Teubner’s interventions, that transplantation
is possible with thoughtful consideration of the interaction between law and various social
systems. See Anthony Forsyth, “The ‘Transplantability’ Debate in Comparative Law and
Comparative Labour Law: Implications for Australian Borrowing from European Labour
Law” (Working Paper No 38, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, The
University of Melbourne, June 2006) at 2-22, online: <http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/
files/dmfile/wp381.pdf>. Although I do not delve deeply into such debates in this article,
informed by their contours, I take a similar position. I thereby pursue a survey of innovative
enforcement initiatives drawn from other common law contexts-sharing important features
with Ontario, focusing principally on their tenor.
42. It is nevertheless important to preface the survey I undertake below by emphasizing that
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Such initiatives fall into two (often mutually-reinforcing) categories: those supporting individual voice and those supporting collective voice. The first category
includes initiatives directed principally at improving workers’ access to complaints
processes, including those where institutions or groups support individuals in
making complaints. The second includes initiatives boosting the involvement of
groups of workers and workers’ advocates in the overall enforcement process.43
In the collective voice category, the diversity of actors and institutions involved
justifies the examples chosen for review given the goal of highlighting examples
where enforcement is not left exclusively to individual workers but, rather, shared
amongst multiple government agencies and external institutions.
A. INNOVATIONS SUPPORTING INDIVIDUAL WORKERS’ VOICE

In the context of a largely reactive regime, one avenue for improving the situation
of workers is to maximize routes to the documentation of complaints. Specifically,
permitting anonymous, confidential, and third-party complaints, in relevant provisions of legislation or through administrative protocols, offers possibilities for
decreasing the burden on individual workers while giving voice to their experiences.
Anonymous complaints are desirable since they provide the most protection for workers still on the job. Through administrative means, the province of
Saskatchewan allows “the employee or a third party such as a parent, friend or a
member of the community” to submit a written claim against an employer, which
the Compliance and Review Unit then investigates.44 The anonymous complaint
option is available if the worker is still employed at the workplace, believes that
provisions of the province’s Labour Standards Act45 are not being followed, and
wants to seek redress but is not in a position to file a formal complaint.46 Only
written complaints with supporting evidence are reviewed. The Compliance and

43.
44.
45.
46.

political and social systems, as well as contexts, matter: In the common law jurisdictions
under study, different circumstances motivated the initiatives that I canvass. For example,
in the United States, historically low rates of unionization are at the root of some leading
federal enforcement strategies. Distinctly, in Australia, several of the enforcement measures
I explore reflect the attempt by a new Labor government to in some way compensate for the
decollectivization and decentralization of labour relations occurring prior to its rise to power.
In the ensuing discussion, as well as in Part IV, below, the distinction between supporting
individual and collective voice is therefore used principally for heuristic purposes.
Saskatchewan Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety, Labour Standards
Division, Anonymous Complaint Form at 1, online: <http://www.lrws.gov.sk.ca/
anonymous-third-party-complaint-form>.
Labour Standards Act, RSS 1978, c L-1.
However, employees seeking wage recovery must file a formal complaint personally.
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Review Unit also pursues expanded investigations in such cases.47 This approach is
indicative of how, in practice, some initiatives oriented to individuals can contribute
to benefits for groups of workers and prepare the ground for improvements to
collective voice. For example, where a claim submitted by a worker is found to apply
to more than one worker at the worksite, the Ministry will expand their inspection to
protect all workers present.48
There are also provisions for anonymous complaints in six American states:
Colorado, New Jersey, California, Connecticut, Illinois, and New York.49 As in
Saskatchewan, provisions of these state laws or administrative measures could be
strengthened by allowing the claimant to write “anonymous” on written forms
rather than requiring that the name of the claimant be listed with the promise
that the claim will be treated anonymously.
More modestly, the province of British Columbia50 and nine American
states51 permit confidential complaints, which keep the identity of the worker
unknown to the best of investigators’ ability during the investigation process.
The Fair Work Ombudsman, an agency responsible for enforcing Australia’s
Fair Work Act,52 is also willing to receive calls from any party who wishes to
complain about an alleged breach of Commonwealth workplaces laws,53 but it
does not guarantee complainants that it will be able to maintain their confidentiality during the course of an investigation.54 In the United States, sixteen states
permit workers to designate another person to bring an unpaid wages lawsuit
on their own behalf or on behalf of other workers who have similar claims,
and seven states allow organizations and individuals, including fellow work47. Saskatchewan Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety, supra note 44.
48. The Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers and Others), 2009,
which extends select labour protections outside the ESA to a group of temporary migrant
workers in jobs known to be highly precarious, also includes provisions for an ESO to meet
with any person who may have contravened the Act, if he or she “acquires information” that
suggests this possibility (i.e., if the ESO receives anonymous tips). See Employment Protection
for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers and Others), 2009, SO 2009, c 32, ss 22(1)-(3).
49. National Employment Law Project, supra note 20 at 58.
50. Employment Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 113, s 75(1).
51. These states are Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, Ohio, Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Carolina, and New York. See National Employment Law Project, supra note 20 at 58.
Among these states, NY Lab § 196-A extends the strongest protections to workers.
52. Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) [Fair Work Act].
53. Commonwealth of Australia, Fair Work Ombudsman, Workplace Complaint Form User
Guide, online: <www.fairwork.gov.au/Complaints1/Workplace-Complaint-Form-UserGuide.pdf> [Accessed 2 March 2012].
54. Commonwealth of Australia, Fair Work Ombudsman, Workplace Complaint Form, online:
<http://www.fairwork.gov.au/Complaints1/Workplace-Complaint-Form.pdf>.
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ers in the same workplace, to file complaints on behalf of affected workers.55
Even under Australia’s new centralized system of industrial relations in which unions
have diminished power, the Fair Work Act also gives unions the right to bring court
proceedings in relation to ES violations experienced by individual workers if they
are entitled to represent the employee in question.56 If the violation relates to a
workplace agreement or workplace determination that binds the union, the union
can also make an application in its own right, on behalf of an employee, or both.57
Anonymous, confidential, and third-party complaints thereby contribute to
alleviating risks for workers and create conditions conducive to the exercise of
voice. They also convey to employers and government officials the message that
coworkers and worker representatives form a larger community in which workers
(especially those in relatively secure employment) act as other workers’ (especially
the precariously employed) keepers, highlighting, once again, important linkages
between improving individual and collective voice.
A presumption of employer retaliation is another tool for lessening potential
harm to workers opting to complain or permitting claims to go forward on their
behalf. This protective device involves creating “a legal protection that any adverse
or discriminatory action taken by an employer against the worker within a certain
period of time after the worker [or another permitted party] complains will be
presumed to be retaliatory.”58 Such provisions simultaneously make it easier for
55. National Employment Law Project, supra note 20 at 58.
56. On the content of these standards and the shift to the Fair Work Act, see Vosko, Managing the
Margins, supra note 12 at 115-17.
57. John Howe, Nicole Yazbek & Sean Cooney, “Study on Labour Inspection Sanctions and
Remedies: The case of Australia,” Working Document No 14 (Geneva: International
Labour Organization, Labour Administration and Inspection Programme, March 2011)
at 32, online: <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---lab_admin/
documents/publication/wcms_154066.pdf> [Howe, Yazbek & Cooney, “Labour Inspection
Sanctions and Remedies”]. There nevertheless remain significant barriers to union
participation in enforcement in Australia, including constraints on unions’ rights of entry to
investigate suspected violations and/or hold meetings with employees, for which they now
require a permit, which was not the case under a previous regime. See Vosko, Managing the
Margins, supra note 12 at ch 4, 6. On the enforcement rights of unions in the Australian
system more generally, see Tess Hardy & John Howe, “Partners in Enforcement? The New
Balance Between Government and Trade Union Enforcement of Employment Standards in
Australia” (2009) 22 Aust J Lab L 306. Furthermore, under the Fair Work Act, the fact that
the Fair Work Ombudsman now has the responsibility for enforcing its terms, including its
intention to control unlawful union activity, such as strikes, could compromise the working
relationship between the Fair Work Ombudsman and unions and thereby undermine
collaborative efforts to address compliance. See Howe, Yazbek & Cooney, “Labour Inspection
Sanctions and Remedies” (ibid) at 32-33.
58. National Employment Law Project, supra note 20 at 60 [emphasis in original].
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workers to bring forward cases of retaliation and simultaneously empower labour
inspectors to investigate such claims. They also place the burden of proof on
employers. Although few pure examples exist, a provision in New York’s Wage Theft
Prevention Act59 provides enhanced rules against retaliation, by including threats as a
form of retaliation and especially by making it illegal for any person to retaliate and
by providing for greater damages.60
Further strategies for empowering individual workers in enforcement processes
include outreach activities on the part of labour inspectorates, which assist workers
in finding and using their voices by bringing state personnel into workplaces in
non-confrontational situations to introduce workers and employers to minimum
labour standards and to explain the inspectorate’s role in enforcement. These outreach activities make state services and supports more accessible to those unfamiliar
with their workplace rights or with available complaints mechanisms, or to those
fearful of approaching enforcement officers. In the United States, such strategies have
grown measurably at the federal level in the last decade. They include efforts tailored
to ethnic communities, such as the Compliance Outreach to the Asian Community
and Hispanics (COACH), through which the Northern New Jersey Office of the
federal Wage and Hour Division visits and works directly with groups of workers and
employers historically reluctant to use its services and introduces them to wage and
hours laws through publications and other educational services. They also encompass
the Rapid Employee Assistance in Chinese Hotline, a telephone hotline geared to
answer questions about employment laws from Chinese-speaking workers in New
York. These two examples predate the public awareness campaign known as “We Can
Help,” launched by the Wages and Hours Division in April 2010. Through this program, the agency is attempting to connect the precariously employed with its services
via collaboration with local worker advocacy and interfaith organizations, to enhance
its presence and improve in-person assistance in complaints processes.61
59. Wage Theft Prevention Act, c 564, § 8380 (McKinney 2010) (available on WL).
60. In publicizing this provision of the Act, the New York State Department of Labor notes that
this protection:
[A]pplies to any worker who alleges that the employer has done something that the employee
thinks breaks a Labor Law or an Order issued by the Commissioner. This applies even if the employee is mistaken about the law, if they acted in good faith and even if the employee does not
cite a specific part of the Labor Law. This law protects employees even if the employer incorrectly believes they made a complaint.

See New York State Department of Labor, Wage Theft Prevention Act Fact Sheet (2011) at 1
[emphasis in original], online: <http://www.labor.ny.gov/formsdocs/wp/P715.pdf>.
61. United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division - We Can Help, online:
<http://www.dol.gov/wecanhelp/>. Although this example involves collaborations between
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Outreach campaigns by government agencies are also undertaken by
Australia’s Fair Work Ombudsman. Such campaigns typically involve audits
of sectors or industries in which worker complaints are high or rising. After
conducting a review revealing that 4,006 complaints pertaining to Australia’s
new National Employment Standards had been lodged by administration support
officers between 2008 and 2010 and that clerical workers made 11,459 enquiries
with the Fair Work Ombudsman between January 2010 and May 2011, the
Ombudsman undertook a national audit of a segment of clerical workers. In addition
to an education and compliance phase, this audit involved first seeking records of
administration employees’ time and wages for assessment against the Fair Work
Act, its regulation, and the relevant industrial instrument (i.e., Clerks - Private
Sector Award 201062). A total of 1,621 businesses were then inspected, resulting
in the recovery of $171,024 in wages and entitlements for 280 employees.63
Enforcement activities responsive to workers’ complaints can also extend
beyond the purview of government labour agencies to include joint initiatives
with other agencies. This tactic is already operational in the United Kingdom,
where the creation of the Pay and Work Rights Helpline aims to streamline access
to the five enforcement bodies charged with employment rights and related legislation—Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs; the Employment Agencies Standards
inspectorate; the Department for the Environment; Food and Rural Affairs, the Health
and Safety Executive; and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority. Under this model,
operators answering calls are trained about these enforcement bodies’ responsibilities and are able to refer cases to the relevant body or bodies. Indeed, as the
report of the Low Pay Commission notes:
[O]ften, cases have to be referred to more than one enforcement body – for example, HMRC [Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs] and EAS [Employment Agencies Standards inspectorate]. This has had a beneficial knock-on effect as the various
collectively-oriented community organizations (from which it also accepts independent
referrals) and state agencies, I place “We Can Help” in the category of initiatives supporting
individuals because it focuses on improving access to the complaints process for individual
workers belonging to marginalized communities.
62. Commonwealth of Australia, Fair Work Commission, MA000002 - Clerks-Private Sector
Award 2010 (19 December 2008), online: <http://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/modern_
awards/award/ma000002/default.htm>.
63. Commonwealth of Australia, Fair Work Ombudsman, National Clerical Workers Campaign
2011: Final Report – June 2012, online: <http://www.fairwork.gov.au/campaignresults/
National/National-Clerical-Workers-Campaign-Report.pdf>. For a review of other efforts by
the Fair Work Ombudsman to engage with unions and workers, see Tess Hardy, “Enrolling
non-state actors to improve compliance with minimum employment standards” (2011) 22:3
Econ & Lab Rel Rev 117.
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enforcement bodies have had to collaborate on multi-issue complaints and have, as
a result, considered joint investigations where possible.64

Such coordinative initiatives facilitate voice, as they recognize that workers
attempting to access complaint mechanisms in one area often need other
kinds of support. They are also attuned to the relationship between employment
status and form of employment, on the one hand, and various types of structural
disadvantage impeding labour market membership, on the other hand.
B. INNOVATIONS SUPPORTING WORKERS’ COLLECTIVE VOICE

In addition to the range of possible means to support individual workers in
situations calling for the use of complaints machinery, there are also a growing
number of initiatives that give groups of workers voice in the enforcement process.
1.

MULTIAGENCY PROACTIVE ENFORCEMENT

In the United States in particular, the use of proactive investigations is becoming
increasingly prominent as a first order strategy in high-risk sectors to draw
out workers’ collective experiences where they are otherwise unlikely to bring
forward individual complaints. For example, in 2011, the US Department of
Labor, as part of its new plan/prevent/protect agenda, initiated an enforcement
sweep focusing on the bottom of the “fissured”65 pyramid of production in the
agricultural industry. Beginning in south Florida and continuing up the east coast,
the sweep was intended to increase compliance and inform workers of their rights
under several core pieces of legislation (e.g., the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act’s Field Sanitation Standard).66 By June of that year, inspectors
64. United Kingdom, National Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission Report 2011 (Presented to
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills, April 2011) at 108,
online: <http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/report/pdf/Revised_Report_PDF_with_April_
date.pdf>.
65. In his work on enforcing labour standards in the United States, David Weil uses the term
“fissured” to describe the expanding number of industries characterized by large lowwage segments whereby lead companies, which together shape product market conditions
affecting workers’ wages and conditions of employment, are effectively separated from the
actual employment of workers. See David Weil, “Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured
Workplaces: The US Experience” (2011) 22:2 Econ & Lab Rel Rev 33 at 34-36. In analyzing
the organization of agricultural production, this term is a suitable descriptor given the
complex contracting arrangements characterizing this sector.
66. The weakness of this strategy is that it fails to reach up to firms at the top of the chain,
which set terms that condition the employment relationships and standards in the most
highly competitive parts of this labour market (i.e., at the bottom). This limitation calls for
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had conducted over twenty investigations, recovered $670,770 in back wages for
approximately six hundred agricultural workers, and assessed over $128,850 in
penalties, finding violations such as “paying workers less than the federal minimum wage, and paying workers at packing sheds who did not qualify for the Fair
Labor Standards Act’s agricultural exemption “straight time” for all hours worked,
rather than time and one-half their regular rates of pay for overtime work hours
as required.”67 This sweep involved sending teams of investigators to fields and
packing houses to assess compliance by “facility owners, growers, farm labor contractors and all other business entities associated with these agricultural operations.
Thorough inspections of transportation, field sanitation facilities, employment
practices and pay records [were] conducted to ensure compliance.”68 A central
component of the department’s surveillance activities involved interviewing
workers at multiple sites simultaneously, presumably to avoid situations in
which fear of reprisal could mount, with numerous investigators covering large
areas on the same day and involving departmental lawyers early in preparing
cases for future litigation.69

embedding the US Department of Labor’s tactic of using sweeps in a strategy of liability
between top and bottom.
67. United States Department of Labor, News Release, “US Labor Department’s Initiative in
South Florida Results in Nearly $800,000 in Back Wage and Fines for Violations Affecting
about 590 Farmworkers” (27 June 2011), online: <http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/
whd/whd20110845.htm>.
68. Ibid.
69. Other more direct examples of measures targeted to industries in the United States include
focussed inspections, undertaken by the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division, in industries
beyond those mentioned in the plan/prevent/protect agenda, such as gas stations and
restaurants. For example, in 2011, after recovering $1.2 million in back wages for almost
four hundred employees at one hundred New Jersey gas stations and finding them “rife with
violative pay practices such as paying workers a flat salary or ‘straight time’ wages for all
hours,” the Wage and Hour Division launched a state-wide initiative involving investigations
at randomly chosen gas stations to educate operators about their obligation to pay the
minimum wage and overtime requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Harold
Brubaker, “Feds Target Wages at N.J. Gas Stations,” Philly.com (23 April 2011), online:
<http://articles.philly.com/2011-04-23/business/29466702_1_minimum-wage-gas-stationsfair-labor-standards-act>. A similar measure, known as a “neighborhood sweep,” involving
labour officials at the state level, and focussing geographically on restaurants in Ithaca, New
York, found 77 per cent of those visited to be violating New York State labour laws in 2009.
See New York State Department of Labor, News Release, “Targeted Labor Department
Investigation Finds Ithaca Restaurant Workers Victimized by Wage Theft” (10 December
2009), online: <http://www.labor.ny.gov/pressreleases/2009/December10_2009.htm>.
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2.

COMMUNITY-BASED ENFORCEMENT

Innovative community-based practices are also emerging in which workers’ advocates
and unions are involved in documenting and redressing violations, and thereby in
discerning common patterns of noncompliance. Empowering workers by enabling
their chosen representatives to work systematically towards improved compliance, the
most institutionalized of those practices are also based in the United States. Examples
include the well-documented and ongoing deputization programs created by the
Los Angeles Unified School District and the Los Angeles Board of Public Workers.70 Under the first program, the Los Angeles Unified School District deputizes
and trains representatives of building trades unions to enforce the prevailing wage on
district projects funded by monies from construction bonds. These representatives are
known as “work preservation volunteers”71 and are provided with badges and business
cards and authorized to enter school sites to conduct compliance visits. This program
arose from a controversial agreement in which construction unions conceded their
right to strike over job issues in exchange for the creation of an internal compliance department by the School District enabling union representatives to conduct
compliance visits. The Los Angeles Board of Public Workers followed suit, training
what it calls compliance group representatives. Both programs are designed to make
these on-the-ground inspectors the representatives of labour inspectors from the City
and thereby expand the City’s enforcement capacity while simultaneously providing workers and their advocates with greater voice. Compliance representatives’
duties include interviewing employees about hours, wages, job classification,
and official duties, as well as problems at work more generally. They also assist
workers in filling out forms in the complaint process when they perceive through
their investigatory efforts that violations have taken place. They do not, however,
determine violations or assess penalties. Under both programs, representatives
are retrained every year. They are not permitted to use their activities to gather
information for their unions, disparage non-union contractors, or review
project data outside a pending complaint. Rather, their role is to mimic the
neutral labour inspector.
These examples represent the strongest version of what Janice Fine and
Jennifer Gordon call community-based enforcement in operation (i.e., enabling
civil society groups to deliver information and education, patrol communities,

70. Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, “Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through
Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations” (2010) 38:4 Pol & Soc’y 552.
71. Ibid at 563.
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file and investigate complaints, and provide ongoing deterrents).72 Program
strengths include their relative permanence and their enshrinement in public law.
Weaknesses include deputies’ inability to advocate for workers facing violation
and/or evasive behaviour. Both programs also follow David Weil’s prescription
for regulatory jujitsu:73 their substantive success flows from the business representatives’ intimate understanding of sector-based issues, their aligning the contours
of their activities to specific rules applicable to public construction, and their
access to detailed data.74
3.

PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN STATE AGENCIES AND COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATIONS

Still another example of community-based enforcement that holds promise as
a model is New York’s former Wage and Hour Watch, which entailed a formal
partnership between New York’s labour department and six agencies including
workers’ centres and unions. This arrangement involved a time-limited memorandum of agreement (signed in 2009) in which the participating organizations
72. Ibid at 558-60.
73. David Weil, “A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection” (2008) 147:4 Int’l Lab Rev 349 at
372.
74. Although it is less institutionalized, another example of community-based enforcement
drawn from the United States where workers gain voice is the Maintenance Cooperation
Trust Fund, a janitorial watchdog involving a California local of the Service Employees
International Union (Local 1877) and lead contractors engaged in collective agreements
with that local. Together, these institutions established a trust fund whose mission is to
abolish unfair business practices in this industry through education as well as investigating
cleaning contractors’ conditions in order to enhance enforcement by public agencies and
private attorneys. Signatory contractors pay between one and five cents per hour worked by
workers to fund such programs, which require a staff of seven to cover the California area.
This staff exposes, persuades, and will ultimately sue violators if they refuse to change. It also
helps state agencies with fact-finding, brings workers to agencies to follow up, and supports
workers engaged in private litigation. As part of its activities, the Maintenance Cooperation
Trust Fund enters monitoring agreements with troublesome contractors and helps cultivate
interagency monitoring. The main limitations of its activities, compared to the preceding
examples, are twofold. First, firms can always choose alternative contractors whereas
more traditional justice for janitors campaigns target worksites, and thus building tenants
must comply with monitoring agreements rather than firms. Second, the Maintenance
Cooperation Trust Fund is not capable of making lasting change inside state agencies because
such agencies are not involved directly as partners. See Catherine K Ruckelshaus, “Labor’s
Wage War” (2008) 35 Fordham Urb LJ 373 at 391-94; Karina Muñiz, “The Janitorial
Industry and the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund” in Ruth Milkman, Joshua Bloom
& Victor Narro, eds, Working For Justice: The L.A. Model of Organizing and Advocacy (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2010) 211.
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agreed to identify and train at least six people to serve as Wage and Hour Watch
members for two years. These individuals, who were not deputized, were to
provide at least two hundred businesses per year with labour law compliance
information, hold sessions for the public, and refer potential labour law violations
to the labour department. They were not authorized to carry out inspections. They
thereby functioned like “neighbourhood watch” applied to the labour standards
domain. Consequently, the chief strengths of the model are that it fosters ongoing
partnerships between the state enforcement bureaucracy and community groups
and preserves the ability of the latter to advocate for workers.75
One successful example of New York Wage and Hour Watch in action,
predating its codification, was the 2007 investigation of a commercial strip in
Bushwick, Brooklyn. This investigation involved a particularly dynamic approach
as it brought the Labor Department’s Division of Labor Standards together with
its Bureau of Immigrant Workers’ Rights in partnering with the Retail, Wholesale
and Department Store Union and Make the Road New York, which, in working
collaboratively, found $350,000 of underpayments owed to sixty workers. After
this determination, the two community agencies remained active in the area,
informing businesses and workers about labour law, resulting in increased compliance, and contributing to a greater sense of community membership amongst
workers highly dependent upon minimum labour standards.76

IV. REMEDYING THE ENFORCEMENT CRISIS IN ONTARIO:
LESSONS FROM ELSEWHERE
Considering the existing array of initiatives emergent in other common law
jurisdictions, what options are available for altering Ontario’s ES regime to begin
to counter the tendency to place enforcement in individual workers’ hands? How
might workers reliant on the ESA and their advocates have a stronger voice in its
enforcement? Since almost all regulatory regimes rely on a mix of approaches and
methods, Ontario’s system could be improved by drawing insights from both the
individual and collective voice mechanisms canvassed here.
75. For a detailed assessment of New York’s Wage and Hour Watch Program and the roots of the
demise of this partnership, see Janice Fine, “Solving the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a
Strategy for Addressing Labor Standards Non-Compliance in the United States” (2013) 50:4
Osgoode Hall LJ 813.
76. New York State Department of Labor, News Release, “Labor Department Initiative
Empowers Ordinary People To Join The Fight Against Wage Theft” (26 January 2009),
online: <http://www.labor.ny.gov/pressreleases/2009/Jan26_2009.htm>.
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A. AUGMENTING WORKERS’ INDIVIDUAL VOICES UNDER THE
COMPLAINT-BASED SYSTEM

At a policy level, it is critical to recognize that an onerous and risky complaints
process requiring the precariously employed to play the protagonist77 works
against the exercise of voice. Maximizing the accessibility of the complaints
process, and supports once it is accessed, is therefore necessary.
The foremost failings of Ontario’s ES enforcement system relate to the onus
placed on individual workers to initiate and proceed through arduous claims
processes, made more complex by the additional requirements (since 2010) that
the claimant confront his or her employer about perceived violations and provide
certain information in writing before he or she is permitted to make a formal
claim. To maximize effective routes to individual claims-making and reduce its
associated risks to workers, the involvement of outside parties and external supports is critical in this context. Rather than making the complaints process more
onerous, the ES enforcement regime could provide for anonymous and third-party complaints to initiate investigations and limit the potential for reprisals against
workers whose rights are in question, changes which could be achieved largely
through the straightforward adaptation of administrative measures. Here, the
anonymous complaints process operating in Saskatchewan and the third-party
complaints permissible in Australia offer preferable models. On the assumption
that complaints may be shared among workers, in such situations Ontario could
also follow Saskatchewan’s lead and pursue expanded investigations.
Permitting anonymous and third-party complaints does not, however,
resolve deficiencies in the support available to workers in the complaints process.
Workers making claims under the Health and Safety, Workplace Safety and
Insurance, and Human Rights regimes are eligible for significant supports from
Occupational Health and Safety Clinics for Ontario Workers, the Office of the
Workers’ Advisor, and the Human Rights Legal Support Centre, respectively.
Enhanced supports, ideally through devoting greater financial resources to legal
aid, are necessary for the ES enforcement regime to function effectively, and for ESdependent workers not only to be deemed to be full members of the labour market
in laws on the books but to be able to exercise their voice and participate in practice.
Timely person-to-person support in the claims process is especially key given the
six month time limit on claims-making and since studies of other jurisdictions
(e.g., British Columbia) show that the self-help model undercuts worker claimsmaking altogether. To buoy such measures, relecting New York state’s wage-theft
77. Tucker, “Old Lessons for New Governance,” supra note 10 at 27.
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legislation, the creation of an effective presumption of employer retaliation is also
important. This would involve boosting the current onus of proof under Ontario’s
ESA78 through measures of interim reinstatement during claims investigation for
workers fired for seeking their ES entitlements, establishing meaningful fines
in cases of documented reprisal, and expanding the circumstances under which
worker protections against retaliation apply as well as the actors that may be
deemed to be engaging in retaliatory behavior.79
In the complaints process, third-party representation of the sort possible in
Australia offers another direction that Ontario could take. This sort of representation is crucial to the expression of individual voice and could contribute to
augmenting workers’ collective voice by, among other things, spawning new or
supporting existing institutions (e.g., unions) devoted to workers’ realization of
their rights. Furthermore, there is no principled reason that third-party representation should be a feature of some pieces of labour legislation and not others.
Assistance through the complaints process, as well as outreach of the sort that
labour inspectorates in other jurisdictions pursue in partnership with community
organizations, would also make such representation more meaningful. So, too,
would greater interagency coordination, that is, the facilitation of links between
different government agencies, in a range of related areas where a worker may be
in a position to complain (e.g., Occupational Health and Safety, Human Rights,
Employment Standards, et cetera). Such coordination has the potential to deliver
fair compensation to workers if collections are simultaneously altered such that costs
of enforcement shift to those that violate the law. Limited fines for employers and
the financial burden of mounting a claim mute workers’ voices in the complaint process, particularly the precariously employed, especially those facing other structural
disadvantages such as migrant workers, for whom claims-making is also constrained
by obligations to households and communities abroad. One potential remedy here
is to require employers found in violation to cover administrative costs (e.g., costs of
investigation). This could act as a deterrent against avoiding compensating workers
for what they are genuinely owed.

78. ESA, supra note 1, s 74(2).
79. For example, the New York state Wage Theft Prevention Act’s anti-retaliatory provisions
are extended under the New York Labor Law. See New York Labor Law, c 31, art 7, § 215
(McKinney 2010) (available on WL).
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B. BEYOND THE INDIVIDUALIZED MODEL: PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE
VOICE

Repairing the complaint-driven system alone is insufficient in increasing voice
amongst ES-dependent workers. Greater avenues for collective action are required,
involving a diversity of actors and institutions in enforcement. From this perspective, practices emergent in other common law jurisdictions confronting
similar problems highlight two channels to pursue in particular.
The first channel involves inventing new collaborations where workers’ designates (e.g., business agents from unions or representatives from entities supporting
non-unionized workers such as workers’ centres) are either deputized to assist in
enforcement or involved in other formal arrangements directed towards similar
ends. Such initiatives offer particular promise in segments of the labour market
characterized by high levels of violation or evasive behaviour on account of the
presence of immigrants and young or women workers, whose social location may
impede their ability to voice complaints as individuals. Although deputization is
ideal under many circumstances, given the limits that it can place on the actions of
workers’ advocates, collaboration between state inspectors and workers’ advocates to
enforce ES rights may be desirable. Initiatives organized by geography, of the sort
evolving under the former New York Wage and Hour Watch, offer strong examples.
They go a considerable distance in bringing the culture of enforcement to the streets,
in giving voice to collectives of workers in a given region or neighbourhood.
Although little known, the MOL’s Administration Manual for Employment
Standards (2010) provides a vehicle through which Ontario could pursue community-based enforcement initiatives of these sorts. It mandates the existence of
an Employment Standards Program Advisory Committee, whose roles include
monitoring “changing circumstances and emerging issues” and assisting “in the
development of strategies and best practices to implement special projects.”80 To
fulfill its mandate, the Employment Standards Program Advisory Committee is
also to review “stakeholder concerns;”81 this committee thereby offers a potential
mechanism for communicating with workers’ organizations and advocates in
improving enforcement.82 Collectively, such provisions permit the committee
to develop and advance initiatives augmenting the collective voice of workers
in conjunction with diverse actors and institutions.
80. MOL, Administration Manual, supra note 19, ss 1.5.3-1.5.4 [emphasis added].
81. Ibid, s 1.5.2.
82. Indeed, in its deliberations, the Employment Standards Program Advisory Committee is
explicitly permitted to invite additional persons to attend meetings to provide information
and participate in discussions. See ibid, s 1.5.7.
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Another channel for increasing collective voice entails conducting regular enforcement sweeps of high-risk sectors of the sort undertaken by the US Department
of Labor and expanded investigations carried out routinely in Saskatchewan. Both
types of undertakings offer attractive models since they cover greater ground
than the investigation of individual complaints and give workers voice by
providing low risk opportunities for the expression of grievances.

V. CONCLUSION
The lack of effective individual and collective voice mechanisms amongst workers
dependent on ES as their primary source of labour protection hinders their access
to formal rights and entitlements. By requiring workers, a sizeable subset of whom
are precariously employed, not only to come forward with their own grievances but
to prepare and present their own cases, often with limited foreseeable pecuniary
benefits beyond obtaining entitlements that they are already owed, Ontario’s
predominantly complaint-based system has a chilling effect. There are, however, other paths to follow. In other common law contexts, where conditions of
work and employment have similarly deteriorated, there are a growing number
of initiatives where the burden of enforcement does not rest predominantly on
individual workers but is rather shared between different government agencies
and external institutions. In such contexts, unions and community groups are
increasingly playing supportive roles in knowledge-sharing about workers’ rights
and taking on substantive responsibilities linked to representation, investigations,
and settlements. In making necessary adaptations to Ontario’s ES enforcement
regime, drawing from these examples of incremental change and especially their
underlying principles could contribute to creating a context in which rights bearers
have better access to meaningful remedies where collective improvements are also
within closer reach.

